We often have to draw conclusions about states of machines in computer science and about states of knowledge and belief in artificial intelligence (AI) based on partial information. Nerode (1990) suggested using constructive (equivalently, intuitionistic) logic as the language to express such deductions and also suggested designing appropriate intuitionistic Kripke frames to express the partial information.
Following this program, Nerode and Wijesekera (1990) developed syntax, semantics and completeness for a system of intuitionistic dynamic logic for proving properties of concurrent programs. Like all dynamics logics, this was a logic of many modalities, each expressing a program, but in intuitionistic rather than in classical logic. In that logic, both box and diamond are needed, but these two are not intuitionistically interdefinable and, worse, diamond does not distribute over 'or'. except for sequential programs.
This also happens in other contemplated computer science and AI applications, and leads outside the class of constructive logics investigated in the literature. The present paper fills this gap. We provide intuitionistic logics with independent box and diamond without assuming distribution of diamond over 'or'. The completeness theorem is based on intuitionistic Kripke frames (partially ordered sets of increasing worlds), but equipped with an additional, quite separate accessibility relation between worlds.
In the interpretation of Nerode and Wijesekera (1990) , worlds under the partial order represent states of partial knowledge, the accessibility represents change in state of partial knowledge resulting from executing a specific program.
But there are many other computer science interpretations. This formalism covers all computer science applications of which we are aware. We also give a cut elimination theorem and algebraic and topological formulations, since these present some new difficulties. Finally, these results were obtained prior to those in Nerode and Wijesekera (1990) .
Syntax, semantics and completeness

Introduction
We develop propositional and predicate modal intuitionistic logic based on minimal axioms for the modal connectives box (necessity) and diamond (possibility). We give a correspondingly general modal intuitionistic Kripke semantics with completeness theorems. The minimality of the axioms is indicated by the observation that, with these axioms, box and diamond are not interdefinable. In fact, they should not be interdefinable if an intuitionistic meaning is given to their 'possible worlds' interpretations.
(See also [2] for a treatment of independent box and diamond. Their system was based on purely philosophical considerations, not computer science. Our systems are motivated instead by intended computer science applications to areas such as dynamic logic and the logic of belief.) Our minimal set of axioms and semantics are general enough to cover the natural axioms and semantics of all intended computer science areas of application of which we know, while still meeting stringent requirements of constructivity. Our systems are fully capable of being implemented naturally in such constructive programming environments as Constable's NUPRL (an implementation of extensions of Martin-Liif's predicative intuitionistic type theory) or Huet-Coquand's CONSTRUCTIONS (an implementation of extensions of Girard's impredicative intuitionistic type theory). For other work on intuitionistic modal logics and their applications, see [3, 6-10, 13, 28, 29, 33, 371. The intuition behind our semantics is that a possible world for the intuitionistic Kripke model should represent a partial state of knowledge about a full classical relational system. Further, the modality should be based on an accessibility relation between these partial states of knowledge. So for worlds (partial states of knowledge) w, u, w s u has the intuitive interpretation that partial state of knowledge r~ has at least as much knowledge as partial state of knowledge w. Let us use the computer science special case of constructive concurrent dynamic logic (CCDL) of [27] t o motivate our minimal system of intuitionistic modal logic more completely. This is historically inaccurate, since our minimal system was developed first, at Nerode's suggestion, but CCDL is too good a motivation to omit. Our minimal system abstracts the intuitionistic modal logic of a single imperative program P executed on a single nondeterministic machine, sequential or concurrent. This minimal system, unlike dynamic logic, wholly omits all apparatus for building up complex programs from simple programs and concentrates instead on the intrinsic modal intuitionistic logic of the transition, or accessibility, relation R from the state S, to state S,, where S, R S, say P, starting on the machine in state Si, has at least one execution sequence completing execution in states S,. In CCDL [27] , a state S, on which R acts, represents partial information, rather than total information, about a complete machine state S. (In classical dynamic logic, only complete machine states are considered.) In the intuitionistic Kripke frames used in CCDL, each world represents partial information about a single complete machine state. If worlds S1, S, represent partial information about the same machine state S, then in the Kripke frame partial ordering s of worlds, S, s S, iff S, contains at least as much information about state S as S1 does. If Tr is a world representing partial information about a complete machine state T other than the complete machine state S referred to above, then T, is incomparable under s with the Sr, S,, . . . representing partial information about S. For classical dynamic logic, the abstract features of a single program accessibility are reflected algebraically by a modal Boolean algebra. There should be a corresponding notion of an intuitionistic modal algebra, corresponding to the intuitionistic modal logic of the accessibility relation of a single program acting on partial information about machine states. Our minimal modal intuitionistic logic has this role. Its algebraic form is modal Heyting algebra, developed in a later section. Finally, our minimal system is broad enough to be used in other computer science and artificial intelligence applications under development jointly with Nerode.
Axioms, rules of inference, Kripke semantics, algebraic semantics, and topological semantics are developed in Sections 1 and 2. Constructive content is brought out by a cut elimination theorem for an LJ-style calculus in Section 1.2. Soundness of axioms and rules of inference with respect to the intended semantics is proved in Section 1.3. Completeness is proved in Section 1.4. The cut rule is shown to be eliminable in Section 1.5; cut elimination is useful for suggesting term rewriting implementations of modal intuitionistic logics in high level functional programming languages such as Constable's NUPRL, or Huet-Coquand's CONSTRUCHONS
Language
The language is that of classical predicate modal logic with A, v , +, 1, 3, If, Cl and 0 as logical connectives. The deductive theory will be constructive (intuitionistic). The semantics will be Kripke intuitionistic frames, equipped with an additional accessibility relation between worlds.
Notational conventions. Lower-case letters from the beginning of the alphabet, possibly with integer subscripts, denote individual constants. CO is the set of individual constants. Upper-case letters from the beginning of the alphabet, possibly with integer subscripts, denote atomic predicates. Lower-case letters from the end of the alphabet, possibly with integer subscripts, denote individual variables. X is the set of all variables xi. Lower-case Greek letters stand for formulas. Upper-case Greek letters stand for sets of formulas. (3) If v(x) is a formula, then so are ((Zlx)~(x)) and ((VX)I&(X)).
We omit parentheses for readibility. We follow standard usage for the notions of free and bound variables. 
for all k' s k.
(3) Then Ik is extended to all sentences QI in the extended language allowing constants in D(k) by the inductive definition below. (v) k It q g, if, for all k ' P k and for all k" such that k' R k", we have that k" It ~1.
(vi) k IF 0~ if, for all k ' 2 k, there is a k" such that k' R k" and k" It q. (1) A sentence p, is satisfied at k E K if k It QX A set Tof sentences is satisfied at k if every member of r is satisfied at k.
(2) cp is satisjiable in M = (K, D, =z, R, It) if there is k E K with q satisfied at k. Notice that our definition of Tll-q is 'local' to one k at a time. It does not say that if M is any intuitionistic modal frame and for all k in K all I+Q in rare satisfied at k, then for all k in K, Q, is satisfied at k. This is a necessary change from most modal logic literature, better suited for such applications as dynamics logic in computer science. Now we prove the fundamental elementary property of any intuitionistic forcing relation. Proof. The proof is as usual by induction on the length of sentences. We give only the inductive cases involving modal connectives.
For Cl. Suppose that k It q cp and that k ' 2 k. Let k" and k"' be such that k" * k' and k" R k"'. Then k d k". Hence k It q lg, implies that k"'It QZJ.
For 0. Suppose that k It Ocp and that k" 3 k' 3 k. Then k"> k implies that there is a k"' such that k" R k"' and k"' It ~1. This gives k' I10q1. q
Sequent calculus
Here we formulate a modal intuitionistic Gentzen sequent calculus, which we prove is sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics. All the sequent calculus notation of Takeuti [38] is used. Any questions of notation can be resolved by consulting that source. For this section, upper-case Greek letters represent finite sequences of sentences. Then q, r represents the sequent obtained by appending Q, to the head of r. Similarly r, q represents the sequent obtained by appending Q, to the tail of r. If r = ( yl, . . . , yti), then let Or denote (Cly,, . . . , Uy,). 
Initial sequents (Axioms)
provided the lower sequent is free of a.
q(a), r>> A r>> A, cp(t) 3x cp(x), r >> A ' r>> A, 3xcp(x)'
where the lower sequent is free of a. Adopt the convention that r1 A means that we use the same proof rules as above, but with the consequent A always restricted to contain at most one sentence. This is called the W-like form of the calculus, following Takeuti [38] . Proof. This is by induction on the proof tree following the lines of [38] . The modal rules can be applied only for LJ-like sequents. Therefore, in the inductive proof, the modal rules do not present extra cases. 0
Soundness of the sequent calculus
By abuse of notation, for a sequent of the form Tt q, r It-q will mean that {YI, * * * , y,,} IF q, where r= (I% . . . , m>. For the nonmodal rules the proof is the same as that for showing the soundness of the W-rules with respect to nonmodal Kripke frames, so these cases are omitted. For the modal rules, assume that (K, D, <, R, IF) is any intuitionistic modal frame. Let k E K. For the rule suppose that k IFEW. To show that k It q lq, let k', k" be such k' R k". Since k It Or, k" It K Therefore k" It cp. Hence k Ik 0~.
For the rule suppose that k It Or and that k It Ogz~ The latter implies that for all k' 2 k, there that ksk' and is a k" E K such that k' R k" and k" It CJX Since k It Or, we get k" II r Hence k"lt r, CJJ. By the inductive assumption, k"It I). Hence k lt01J~.
For the rule suppose that k It Or, 0~. Then for all k' 3 k, there is a k" E K such that k' R k" and k" It QI Since k It Or, we get k" It r, QI. By the inductive assumption this is impossible. This completes the proof of soundness. 0
Completeness of the sequent calculus
This section proves that the sequent calculus of Section 1.2 is complete with respect to the semantics given in Section 1.1. The usual completeness proof for classical modal logic uses as worlds maximal consistent sets closed under modalities and uses an accessibility relation between these worlds. There is no partial ordering of increasing information present. The usual completeness proof for intuitionistic nonmodal logic uses prime filters as possible worlds, partially ordered by inclusion. There are no modalities in the calculus, and no separate accessbility in the frame. The first thought is that for intuitionistic modal logic we should combine these two methodologies, and use certain prime filters and an appropriate accessibility between prime filters to reflect the modality. If we had assumed the distributivity of diamond over 'or', we can easily carry this program out. But to cover all intended computer science applications, we have to avoid using this axiom of distributivity. In the completeness proof for our systems, but not in the direct definition of intuitionistic modal frames, we need a more subtle 'set accessibility' in which single prime filters access sets of prime filters instead of individual prime filters. This device is embodied in the notion of a 'segment' given below. Intuitionistic modal logics needing such 'segments' arise in interpreting partial information in computer science, see [27] . There a 'set' accessibility arises in dynamic logic whenever we interpret a concurrent program in Peleg concurrent transition systems which are not sequential. Not allowing such 'set' accessibility would restrict attention to sequential programs, and indeed corresponds roughly to assuming diamond distributes over 'or'. Notation 1.4.1. Let r be a set of sentences. By abuse of notation, write l-t (p if there is a finite subset of sentences r' of r such that r' l-q~. Then cp is called a consequence of r. Call r deductively closed if r contains all its consequences. Definition 1.4.2. Let r be a set of sentences in language L. Then r is saturated in L if the following conditions hold:
(i) r is consistent and deductively closed.
(ii) IfqvrjjeT, theng,ErorqeE (iii) If 3x q(x) E r, then q(c) E rfor some c in L. Notation 1.4.3. Let L be a countable language, let C be a countable set of individual constants outside L. Let L(C) denotes the language formed from L by including C.
Lemma 1.4.4. In a countable intuitionistic modal logic language L, suppose that (r t q) is not true. Then there is a r' 2 r such that r' is saturated in L(C) and
(r' t cp) is not true.
Proof. See [40] . 0 Theorem 1.4.5 (Completeness). (3) Suppose that Q, is cpl-+ q2. If k It cpl-, q2 and vpl+ q2 $ r, then (r I-q,+ q2) is not true. The proof rules for + imply that (r, q1 t q2) is not true either. By Lemma 1.4.4 choose a r' saturated with respect to some L(C,,),
Suppose that (r E q) is not true. Then there exists a modal frame (K, D, G, R, It ) and a kO E K such that kO It r, but not (k, It q).
where Cr, 2 Cr and I" 2 r U { cpI}, but v2 $ r'. Carry out the same proof that was used to construct SO in the proof of the main theorem and construct a segment k' = ((I", Cr), A,.), for some set of bases Arr. By the inductive assumption for I" there is a k' 2 k with k' It q1 but not k' It tp2. But this contradicts k It ql+ q2.
Conversely, suppose that ql+ q2 E r and not k It cpl+ cp2. Then there exists a k' E K with k's k and k' It cpI and not k' It q2. Therefore, by the inductive assumption, we get that sp, E r' and q2 $ r', where H(k') = (r', C,.). Since k' 2 k, we get that I" 2 r. SO vi+ q2 E r". Since r' is deductively close, we conclude that q2 E r', a contradiction.
(4) Suppose that q is l~li. The proof is similar to that for case 3. ((I", C,,), {(To, C,) : 00 E r}) is a segment, where (r', Cr.) = (I', C,). Note that k' R k" implies H(k") = (ro, C,) for some r,. Because vi $ r,, by the inductive hypothesis it is not true that ((G, C,) It vi). Hence there exists a k' E K such that no k" with k' R k" satisfies (k"It Q),). This contradicts k It 0~~. Conversely, if 0~ E r, then for all k' 2 k, for H(k') = (r', Cr.), we get that 0~ E r'. Hence 9, E r" for some k" with k' R k". If H(k") = (rl, C,-) , by the inductive assumption we get k" It q.
(8) Suppose that q is 0~~. If k It q lq, and Elq, 4 r, then for each 00 E r, let r, be a saturated extension of { 0) U I= as before. It is false that (r t vi), hence we can extend r to a saturated r' so that vi 4 r'. Now ((r, C,), {(rr, C,,)> U {(G, CT,): Ve E w = k' is a segment. Using the same method as at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 1.4.5, we can create segments corresponding to T(k'). Let k" be the segment with H(k") = (I", C,,). Then we have k', k" with k G k' and k' R k", but not (k" It q).
This contradicts (k II-0~). Conversely, suppose that q lq, E l-. Then q lv, E I" for each k' 2 k with H(k') = I". Therefore for any k" with k' R k" and (r", C,.) = H(k"), we have that vi E I"'. By the inductive hypotheses we conclude that k" It-ql.
This ends the proof of Lemma 1.4.6, and Lemma 1.4.6 completes the proof of the completeness Theorem 1.4.5. 0
Hilbert style axioms
It is possible to develop Hilbert style axioms from the sequent formulation of Section 1.2. We devote this section to that task.
Axioms
(i) Axioms for intuitionistic predicate logic.
(ii) q (V-+ rP)--, (n~?+oV). (ii) If tq, then t0~.
with the usual restrictions.
The equivalence of this Hilbert style system with the sequent formulation previously given is the content of the following lemma. (1) The axioms of intuitionistic predicate calculus are proved as usual for sequent calculus.
(2) For (ii),
tocv Alv)+(v AT) .
The proof rules are instances of W-like rules.
Conversely, to show that 'if At r/~, then At-cp', it is enough to justify the steps that use the modal rules in a sequent-style proof by means of the Hilbert system.
So we show that the modal rules are derived rules of the Hilbert system. Or t-0~ + 00. By the deduction theorem, Or, 0~ k 00.
(3) For the argument follows from (2) and the axiom O(6 A -10) --;, (8 A 10). 0 2. Cut elimination, algebraic and topological semantics
Freedom of cut and its consequences
This section gives a proof of the 'freedom of cut' in the W-like sequent calculus of Section 1.2. The notation and general outline of Takeuti's proof of cut elimination [38, p. 21-281 are used, the reader is referred there for all unexplained notations. Since Takeuti's calculus has no modalities, we have to define exactly all notions where modalities play an essential role. The cases that are necessary to establish the freedom of cut with the modal connectives are the only ones presented here. Notions from sequent calculus such as 'deduction tree' and a 'thread' in a deduction tree are used without definition. The notion of a 'principal formula' of an inference figure is assumed known and is indicated beside the figure+.g.
is an inference figure with principal formula q. When the sequent roccurs in the above inference figure, I'* denotes the sequent r with occurrences of ~1 deleted.
The following rule, known as Mix rule, is substituted for cut.
Mix rule
The following lemma is now a triviality. Proof. See [38] . Cl Definition 2.1.2. Let P be a proof which contains a mix rule only as the last inference where q is the mix formula.
(1) The rank of a thread above s1 is the number of consecutive sequents that contain the formula q, starting from s1 and counting upwards.
(2)
(3) (4) (5) Left rank of P = rank,(P) = max{rank(F, P) :F is a left thread}, Right rank of P = rank,(P) = max{rank(F, P): F is a right thread}. Rank(P) = rank,(P) + rank,(P). Grade(q) = number of logical connectives occurring in QX Grade of a mix rule = grade of the principal formula of the mix rule.
Lemma 2.1.3. If P is a proof of r k cp in which only one mix occurs, and that occurring as the last inference, then Tt Q, is provable without a mix.
Proof. The proof is by double induction on the rank and the grade. The inductive hypothesis is that the statement of the lemma is valid for all formulas of lower grade, and we prove it for proofs of current grade. Case 1. rank= 2. Let P be Case 1.1. Either s1 or s2 is an initial sequent. The proof is the same as Takeuti's. Case 1.2. Either s, or s2 is a structural rule. The proof is the same as Takeuti's. Case 1.3. Both s1 and s2 are logical rules. In this case, rank = 2 implies rank, = 1 = rank,. Hence the principal formula must be the mix formula. Only where a modal rule is involved will it be presented. The other cases are the same as in [38] . This can be replaced by the 00, mix-free proof A, e;";7 ; elk(el).
CIA, b& get
The proof, when the logical rules involved are nonmodal, are as they appear in [38] . Case 2. rank(P) > 2. Case 2.1. Rank,(P) > 1.
Let the inference be of the form
A, II; k O1 '
where the mix formula does not occur in A and sz is a logical rule. The thing to notice is that the logical rule involved cannot be a modal rule for, otherwise rank, = 1. Hence the proof follows as in Takeuti [38] .
2.1.2. All other forms of inference with rank(P) > 2 and rank,(P) > 1 are as in Takeuti [38] . Case 2.2. rank,(P) = 1. Then rank,(P) > 1. In this case the only way a modal rule can be used in the left-hand antecedent is when it is of the form but this cannot be involved in a mix as the consequent is empty. All other instances of the present case are a repetition of the standard proof and are therefore omitted. q Theorem 2.1.4.
If r t 9, is proved in the W-like calculus as originally proposed ( i.e., with cut instead of mix), then r F Q, is provable without a cut.
Proof. The usual proof works with the following two observations.
(i) Cut and mix rules are equivalent. (ii) We can inductively traverse down a proof tree, and replace its first cut by a cut-free subtree, and then proceed down to the root. 0
Consequences of freedom of cut
The standard proofs of interpolation theorems follow from modifications, rather than the addition of cases, to usual proofs.
Lemma 2.1.5. Let r 1 Q, be provable and let 4, G be a partition of IY Then there is a sentence I# such that (i) GkVand V, Gkq;
(ii) the nonlogical symbols of q!~ G L1 U Lz, where Lj = (nonlogical symbols of &} for i = 1, 2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number k of inferences in the cut-free proof of r t q. Case (i). k = 0. Then rl-pl must be Q, F q. Take t& to be 97. Case (ii) . k > 0. Then we need a case analysis on the last inference of the proof. Once again we give only the cases where the last inference is a modal rule and refer the rest to [38] .
(1) Suppose the last inference is nte q Al-ue and A = A, U A2 is the partition of A. Then by inductive assumption we get a 8, satisfying A, I-8, and AZ, 8,F 8. By applying 0 we get Now CIA1 U CIA, is a partition of q A, and 00, is the new sentence.
(2) Suppose the last inference is A, 8, E e2 on, 00, t 00, .
Let q A,, 00, and iIlA2 be a partition of the lower antecedent. 
Heyting modal algebras
This section provides an algebras extending Heyting algebraic semantics by defining Heyting modal algebras, analogous to classical modal algebras extending Boolean algebras. The remaining sections are restricted to the algebraic version of propositional intuitionistic modal logic only. The extension to modal intuitionistic predicate logic can be developed following Rasiowa-Sikorski and Henkin-Tarski-Monk, and is not developed here. An additional symbol I is added to the syntax already given for falsehood. A structure (H, G, A, v ,+, I, T, L, M) is a Heyting modal algebra if (1) (H, S, A, v, 3, I, T) is a Heyting algebra,
Definition 2.2.1.
(i) L: H-H satisfies L(T) = T, L(x n y) = L(x) n L(y), (ii) M: H-, H satisfies M is monotone, M(I) = I, L(x) II M(y) s M(x rl y).
Definition 2.2.2. An assignment of intuitionistic propositional modal logic in a modal algebra His a function h with domain the set of atomic propositions, range a subset of H. Each assignment h has a unique extension to an 'algebraic interpretation' or homomorphism h mapping the set of all modal propositions to H as follows:
h(l) = I, h(q, * 9) = h(v) A h(G), h(v v $) = h(v) v h(#), h(v+ @) = h(e) Jh(@), h(W) = L(h(q)), h(Ov) = M@(v)).
Then Q, is called true, or valid, in the algebraic interpretation if h(q) = T. Hence L(h(0,)) A M(h(8,))+M(h(8,) 
Rules of inference
Modus ponens follows from the usual argument. As for necessitation-i.e., if tq, then FE@, assume that h(q)= T . Then h(!Jq)=L(h(q) )=L(T)= T. The soundness of the axiom system now follows. q Theorem
(Completeness theorem). Zf cp is valid in all algebraic interpretations, then t-q.
Proof. The contrapositive is easily shown by assuming that tg, is not true and using the appropriate Lindenbaum algebra construction sketched below. It is now seen that there is an algebraic interpretation h such that h(q) # T, contradicting the assumption. 0
Topological models of constructive modal logic.
In this section the standard interpretation of intuitionistic logic by open sets in a topological space is extended to accommodate the modal operators. The basic structure used is a topological space with a distinguished relation on its points. R(x, y) for some x E u}, : R(x, y) for some y E u}. is a structure (T, z, R, h) such that (i) (T, -c) is a topological space and R is a relation on T.
R-'(u) = {x E T
Definition 2.3.2. A topological interpretation of intuitionistic propositional modal logic in a topological model
(ii) h : the set of propositions +r satisfying the following properties:
( q (h(q) ),
1) h(l) =O and h(T) = T, (2) h(q, v 412) = h(%) u h(Q)& (3) h(ql A ~2) = h(cp,) n h(Q)& (4) h(rp-+ ~2) = Wh(&" U h(&),
h(Ov) = O@(v))- Proof. In order to prove this, it is only necessary to see that the axioms are true and the rules of inference preserve truth. Only the modal axioms will be shown to be true. For the others, see a standard reference such as [40] . Pick any topological interpretation ( T, t, R, h) .
(1) Suppose that Q, is q l(q, + c&-(Clq,+ 0~~). R(uI fl u2) c R(u,) rl R(u,) 
Then u1 n u2 E (U {u E t: R(u) c h(rp,)}) , justifying (1).
(2) Suppose that Q, is q (v,+ v2)+ (0~ 40~~~). =h(rp,) and B=h(q,) .
Pick any x ELL,II~,, where R(u,) G int(A" U B) and u2 G R-'(A) for ul, u2 E t. Then x E u2 implies that there is a y EA with R(x, y) . Then x E u1 and R(u,) R-'(B) .
Hence u1 ll u2 E R-'(B) , justifying (2).
(3) Suppose that cp is q g7, A O(qi + q2) -0q12. To show that h(q) = T it is enough to show that
(lJ {u E z:R(u) EA)) rl (IJ {u E z:u E R-'(int(A'U B))})
+{UET :UER-l(B)}) , where A = h(rp,) and B = h(q2) .
Pick any x E u1 fl u2, R(q) cA and u2 c R-'(int(A" U B)) with ui, u2 E t. Then there exists a y E int (A' U B) such that R(x, y) . Then x E u1 and R(u,) O(h(l) ) =00=0.
Hence h(01+ I) = T.
For the modal rules, we must show that h( Cp) = T implies h(Cl+) = T. This is true because h(O@) = Cl(h#) = UT = LJ {u : R(u) G T} = T.
This, combined with the proof of soundness of the topological interpretation for intuitionistic propositional logic, gives the soundness result that is sought. 0 e sy alaql '((cb)zj),_u 5 n asnwaa *n 3,03 'n 30 arnsop preMdn aql h$g '0) c ,(I) he asooq3 'ho 41 cr) )eq~ ~oqs 0~ '((d)zj),_y 5 n pue 2 3 n 3 n, J! 'blaslahuo=)
. R(w', CO") hence (T, z, R, h) , as given above, is a topological interpretation in. which h( I/J) # T, so I/J fails. 0
A homomorphism
Every Heyting algebra is embeddable in a topological Heyting algebra. We generalize this, but get only a homomorphism. Proof . Let (H, C, A, v, 3, I, T, q , 0 (f (h,)' Uf (h2) ).
We verify
(1) f @a) = of (a) = U Iv E r:R(v) Ef (a)},
(2) f(Oa)=Of(a)=U{VEZ:vcR-'(f(a))}. Op) R (ul, Opl) , then by definition of R, a E ul. Hence  (u,, Op,) E f (a) . Note that {(u, Op) R(w, U) , then there is a V E P(W) such that (i) NO', V), (ii) for all 21 E V there is u E U such that u 2 U.
Verification of (1). We show that {(u, Op) E H* : q a E u} = U {v E z: R(v) E f(a)}. If q la E u and (u,
Forcing is defined as II-in Definition 1. V,, define VOD, V,, as V,. Include V,-, and V,-, in U,,,. If CJ,, is finite, then so is II,,,. Let U={U V,<*:oEWU and V,,<. is defined for all n}, IlEO where a<" denotes the finite sequence that consist of the first n entries of u. Condition 3.1.4(ii) is satisfied by construction. For 3.1.4(i), suppose that OI& $ w. Then I# $ V,. Hence there exists a V, E U with t+!~ $ V,. Hence (w, U) is an accessibility pair. 0 Lemma 3.1. 6. Let w, o' E F with w s CO' and (w, U) and by Axiom (ii), w t 08. So 08 E o, a contradiction. Let o' = o U {UT}, and extend o' to W" E F so that 00 $ w". Let U = { 1+9 : 0~) E co"}. Notice that U is a proper filter, and 8 $ U. Hence if we carry out the same procedure as in Lemma 3.1.5, we get U' c W satisfying R(w", U') with 0 $ U' for some U' E U. Then by the inductive assumption, U' lY 8. Hence o (r 00. Proof . Suppose (T, z, R, h) is an interpretation into a topological model. Then it is necessary to verify that if k ~1, then h(q) = T. What is presented below is only a verification of the modal axioms and rules of inference. Proof. Assume not rt-Q.J and produce a Kripke model for not r It QX Use the same methods as in Lemma 2.3.5 to turn this into a topological model. q
Ewald's axioms
The system of modal logic developed by Ewalds [7] uses more axioms than presented here, and is too restrictive to cover our intended application to constructive concurrent dynamic logic. Plotkin and Stirling [33] presented an equivalent set of axioms. We sketch the Ewalds-Stirling-Plotkin system here, because it has the right conditions for describing constructive sequential dynamic logic. R(o,, 02) implies that there exists a u2s w2 with R(uI, u2) . u2s w2 and R(o,, w2) implies that there exists a u1 3 w, with R(uI, 1.4~) . R(w', w") , we have ~"lt pl.
Semantics
Axioms
(1) Axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic. R(u,, UJ implies there is a W,S u2 with R(w,, wJ;   (4 W,S u2 and R(u,, u2) implies there is a w1 c u1 with R(wI, w2) .
Proof. See Ewalds [7] . 0
Plotkin and Stirling also presented an equivalent system in their extended abstract [33] .
